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CURRENT DECISIONS
tinues and seems likely to persist until the matter is ultimately settled.
Even the Supreme Court in remanding this case stated emphatically
that they recognized the "widespread support for the recognition of
labor unions as juridical personalities". 1 With this statement, the Court
itself seems to feel the need for change but only differs as to which
branch of the federal government should initiate the change. They feel
and with some justification, regardless of the opinions of their critics,
that the proper avenue for correction of this situation is solely within
the responsibility of Congress.
David K. Sutelan
Torts-FEDERAL TORT CLAiMS Acr-GovERNmENT LABILITY FOR
TORTS OF SERVICEMEN. Contrary to Army regulations, defendant, an
Army sergeant, inadvertently took home a few small explosive devices
and left them in a drawer. Plaintiff, a thirteen-year-old boy, was given
one of these devices by defendant's wife. Plaintiff lit the fuse, but be-
fore he could throw the device, it exploded, causing serious injuries.'
In an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act,2 the District Court
denied recovery under Georgia law on the ground that the intervening
act of the wife "snapped the chain of causation" that might impose any
liability of the United States for the negligence of the sergeant. The
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed this ruling, finding that the
intervening act was forseeable under Georgia law, and hence, the
Government was liable in the absence of any affirmative defenses. The
case was remanded for a determination of the issue of contributory neg-
ligence.
Both courts invoked the Georgia rules of respondeat superior in find-
16. United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, supra note 1, at 276.
1. Williams v. United States, 352 F. 2d 477 (5th Cir. 1965).
2. "[Tlhe district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions or
claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." U.S.C.A. #1346(b) (1950).
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ing that the sergeant was "acting in the line of duty" 3 when he failed to
return the explosives. This interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act
was consistent with well-established precedent in resolving the follow-
ing issues of statutory construction: (1) Whether federal or state rules
govern in determining when an employee of the Government is "acting
within the scope of his office or employment"; and (2) The distinction
in meaning between the phrases "acting in the scope of his office or em-
ployment" and "acting in the line of duty" as used in the act for de-
lineating the area of government liability for tortious acts of civilian as
opposed to military employees.
Concerning the first of these issues, the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1949 adopted the policy that the act should be construed liber-
ally.4 Yet many courts restricted its scope by invoking federal rules to
determine the scope of employment" in spite of the apparently unam-
biguous provision of the act specifying that the lex loci delicti should
determine the liability of the United States.' The climax of this trend
came in Williams v. United States (1954), 7 where the Circuit Court
held that "acting in the line of duty" meant "acting in the line of mili-
tary duty", and rejected the application of California rules of respondeat
3. "'Employee of the government' includes ... members of the military or naval
forces of the United States . . ." "'Acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment', in the case a member of the military or naval forces of the United States, means
acting in the line of duty." 28 US.C.A. #2671 (1950).
4. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co, 338 U.S. 366, (1949); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co, 340 US. 543, (1951); Sommerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.
2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); Salter v. Keleket X-Ray Corp, 172 F. Supp. 715 (D.C.D.C.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 275 F. 2d 167, 107 US. App. D.C. 138; Jones v. United
States, 126 F. Supp. 10 (D.CD.C. 1954), aff'd, 228 F. 2d 52, 97 US. App. D.C. 81.
5. "[Wlhether Sergeant Thompson was 'acting within the scope of his office or
employment' within the meaning of the statute ... involves a question of statutory
construction as to which the federal courts are not bound by local decisions but apply
their own standards ... We look to the federal law and decisions to determine
whether or not the person who inflicted the injury was an 'employee of the Govern-
ment ... acting within the scope of his office or employment' We look to local law
for the purpose of determining whether the act . . .gives rise to liability." United
States v. Sharpe, 189 F. 2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1951).
In accord: United States v. Eleazer, 177 F. 2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 903 (1950); United States v. Campbell, 172 F. 2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 377 US. 957 (1949); Hubusch v. United States, 174, 2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949); United
States v. Lushbough, 200 F. 2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952); Williams v. United States, 105 F.
Supp. 208 (D.C. Cal. 1952) (see note 7, infra); United States v. Inmon, 205 F. 2d 681
(5th Cir. 1953); Field v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 401 (D.C.N.D. 1952); Jozwiak v.
United States, 123 F. Supp. 65 (D.C. Ohio 1954).
6. Supra note 3.
7. 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954).
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superior to cases involving members of military or naval forces by rea-
son of the "drastic modification" of the master and servant doctrine
adopted by Congress.8 However, in a terse per curiam decision the Su-
preme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision and remanded the
case for consideration in light of the California doctrine of respondeat
superior.9
By adopting this interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, The
Supreme Court gave the federal courts wide latitude for defining "act-
ing in the line of duty" as it relates to military personnel.'0 In effect, the
courts were bound neither by military interpretations nor by state
precedents, since state doctrines of respondeat superior developed quite
independently of any considerations of military service. The courts,
ignoring the obvious dissimilarities existing between military service and
civilian employment, solve the second issue by virtually abolishing any
distinction between "scope of employment" and "line of duty" that
Congress might have contemplated. "Acting in the line of duty merely
invokes the state law of respondeat superior." " As a result, the courts
8. Ibid. This case involved an automobile accident caused by an intoxicated soldier
out joyriding in a military vehicle issued to another. The court said that California
rules of respondeat superior would apply to cases involving civilian employees of the
Government," ... but in dealing with the problem of federal liability for tortious acts
of ?nembers of the military and naval forces a wholly different situation is presented
because Congress saw fit to adopt a drastic modification of this 'master and servant'
doctrine. By carefully chosen language it delineated the area of this group by speci-
fically providing that so far as. concerns such acts, the phrase 'acting within the scope
of his office or employment' shall mean 'acting in the line of duty.' By use of such
plain, unambiguous, and highly significant language, Congress made abundantly plain
that federal liability can arise only when the tortious act was committed a time when
the tort feasor ... was actually 'acting in the line of duty.' Unless we ari prepared
to utterly disregard this mandate and refuse to conform to its obvious meaning, we
must... hold that 'acting in the line of duty'.means acting in the line of military duty
. .. We need not stress the fact that when the sovereign waives its immunity from
suit, it may, as here, do so on its own terms." Williams v. United States, 215 F. 2d 800,
807, 808 (9th Cir. 1955), lower court decision, 105 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. Cal. 1952). See
note 8, infra.
9. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, (1955).
10. Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the phrase "line of duty", has been used
to determine benefit claims by members of the armed services, and it has been
liberally construed.
11. Merritt v. United States, 332 F. 2d 397, 398 (1st Cir. 1964).
"[F]or the purpose of respondeat superior, [the status of a member of the armed
services] is to be considered similar to that of any private employee. We discern no
basis in the statute ... for making a distinction which would extend the scope and
application of respondeat superior beyond that traditionally applied to private em-
ployers simply because the federal government in its military capacity finds itself in
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have been reluctant to expand governmental liability for tortious acts
of servicemen beyond the recognized limits of "scope of employment"
as defined in the state where the tort arose.' 2 Hence, there exists no uni-
form interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, since the decision in
a particular case may depend to some extent upon the location of the
tort.
In the instant case it appears that the Georgia rules of respondeat
superior permitted the Court of Appeals to adopt a fairly liberal inter-
pretation of "acting in the line of duty" where a more strict construc-
tion could produce a different result. The Federal Tort Claims Act spec-
ifies both "scope of employment" and "line of duty" as bases of govern-
ment liability. Equating these two concepts under the respondeat super-
ior doctrines of the several states introduces unnecessary geographic in-
consistencies into the application of the act to military personnel. These
inconsistencies might be substantially diminished by the adoption of a
uniform liberal interpretation of "acting in the line of duty" which
would be more in keeping with the apparent purpose and tenor of the
act.
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the role of employer." Chapin v. United States, 258 F. 2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 924, ( ).
In accord: McCall v. United States, 338 F. 2d 589 (C.A. Wash. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 974, United States v. Taylor, 236 F. 2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956). 74 A.L.R. 2d 860,
cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 801; United States v. Hainline, 315 F. 2d 153 (10th Cit. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895; United States v. Campbell, 172 F. 2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957; Hinson v. United States, 257 F. 2d 178 (CA. Ga. 1958).
12. In McCall v. United States, 338 F. 2d 589 (9th Cir. 1964), recovery was denied
for a death caused by the negligent driving of a Navy serviceman on leave, who had
requested and received permission to transfer from a vessel moored in California to a
vessel docked in Washington, and who was driving his own automobile. The reason
given was that the use of the automobile was authorized for the convenience of the
serviceman only, and was effected at no expense to the government.
Yet the same court allowed a recovery under similar circumstances, where the
serviceman on leave was to be reimbursed for expense incurred in driving to a new
base. United States v. Kennedy, 23 F. 2d 674 (9th Cir. 1956).
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